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CHAPTER 26 




Policy makers typically approach human behavior 
from the perspective of the rational agent model, 
\Vhich relics on norn1ativc, a priori analyses. The 
nlodel assumes people make insightful, well-planned, 
highly controlled, and calculated decisions guided by 
considerations of personal utility. This perspective is 
promoted in the social sciences and in protCssional 
schools and has come to don1inate much of the for­
mulation and conduct of policy. An alternative vie\\', 
developed mostly through empirical behavioral re­
search, and the one V.'C \Vill articulate here, provides 
a substantially difierent perspective on individual 
behavior and its policy and regulatory implications. 
According to the empirical perspective, behavior is 
the an1algam of perceptions, in1pulses, judgments, 
and decision processes that emerge from the impres­
sive machinery that people carry behind the eyes and 
benveen the ears. Actual human behavior, it is argued, 
is often unforeseen and misunderstood by classical 
policy thinking. A n1ore nuanced behavioral perspec­
tive, it is suggested, can yield deeper understanding 
and in1proved regulatory insight. 
for a motivating example, consider the recent 
mortgage crisis in the United States. While the po­
tential causes are 1nyriad, a central proble1n \Vas that 
n1any borro\vers \Vere offered and took out loans that 
they did not understand and could not afford, \Vith di­
sastrous results for the borro\vers, financial firms, and 
the national economy. Borrov.'ers, like most people, 
arc not \veil described by the rational agent nlodel. 
At the same ti1ne, \Ve argue, a behavioral perspective 
that fOcuses only on the individual is incomplete for 
policy purposes. In so1ne contexts, firms have strong 
incentives to exploit consu1ner biases and v..·ill shape 
their conduct in response not only to the behavior of 
consumers but also to the actions of regulators. Thus, 
policy also needs to take into account market contexts 
and the incentives and behaviors that they affOrd firms. 
I n  •vhat fO!lov .. ·s, \\'e v.. rill outline some of the n1ain 
research underpinning the behavioral perspective 
pertinent to regulation. We v..rill explore ho\v firms 
interact with consumers in different market contexts 
and \Vill propose a model tOr understanding this in­
teraction. We \viii then develop an analytic fran1ev..rork 
fOr behaviorally infOrmed regulation and conclude 
\Vith examples of relevant policy applications. 
Dn Behavior 
In contrast v..·ith the classical theory, \Vhich is driven 
by rational agents v..·ho make well-infOrmed, carefully 
considered, and fully controlled choices, behavioral 
research has sho\vn that individuals depart from this 
decision-making model in important \\'ays. Among 
other things, the availability and dissemination of 
data do not always lead to effective con1n1unication 
and kno\vledgc; understanding and intention do not 
necessarily lead to the desired action; and purportedly 
inconsequential contextual nuances, \\'hether inten­
tional or not, can shape behavior and alter choices, 
often in \vays that people themselves agree din1in­
ish their \\'Cll-being in unintended \vays. Individuals 
often exhibit temporal biases and mistOrecast their 
O\Vn behavior. By way of illustration, \Ve \viii highlight 
ho\v context, decisional conflict, mental accounting, 
knowledge and attention constraints, and institutions, 
shape individual decisions and behavior. 
Context 
Human behavior turns out to be hea\'ily context de­
pendent, a function of both the person and the situa­
tion. ()ne of the nlajor lessons of modern psychologi­
cal research is the in1pressi\'e po\ver that the situation 
exerts, along \\'ith a persistent tendency to underes­
timate that po\vcr relative to the presumed influence 
of intention, education, or personality traits. In his 
no\v-classic obedience studies, fOr exa1nple, Milgra1n 
( 197 4) sho\\·ed ho\v decidedly mild situational pres-
sures sufficed to generate persistent \Villingncss, 
against their O\\'n \vishes, on the part of individuals 
to administer \vhat they believed to be grave levels 
of electric shock to innocent subjects. Along si1nilar 
lines, Darley and Batson (1973) recruited scn1inary 
students to deliver a practice sermon on the parable 
of the Good Samaritan. While half the seminarians 
were told they had plenty of time, others \Vere led to 
believe they \Vere running late. On their \vay to give 
the talk, all participants passed an ostensibly injured 
man slumped in a door\vay groaning. Whereas the 
majority of those with time to spare stopped to help, 
a mere 10% of those \Vho \Vere running late stopped, 
while the remaining 90% stepped over the victim and 
rushed along. In contrast \Vith these people's ethical 
training, scholarship, and presumed character, the 
contextual nuance of a minor time constraint proved 
decisive in the decision of \Vhether to stop to help 
a suffCring man. The powerful impact of context on 
behavior, we argue, increases the importance of effec­
tive regulation and regulators' responsibility to assess 
effectiveness in policy contexts. 
Context is made all the more important because 
an individual's predictions about her behavior in the 
future are often made in contexts different from those 
in \Vhich the individual v.rill later find herself. Kochler 
and Poon (2005; See Lev.rin, 1951) argued that peo­
ple's predictions of their future behavior ovcr\\•eight 
the strength of their current intentions and under­
\veight the contextual factors that influence the likeli­
hood that those intentions \vill translate into action. 
This imbalance can generate systematically misguided 
plans among consun1ers, \vho, reassured by their good 
intentions, proceed to put themselves in ill-conceived 
situations that are pov.'crfu l enough to 1nake them act 
and choose other\vise. 
Decisional Conflict 
Three decades of behavioral research have led to the 
notion that people's preferences arc typically con­
structed, not merely revealed, during the decision 
nlaking process (Lichtenstein and S\oYic, 2006). The 
construction of preferences is heavily influenced by 
the nature and the context of decision. For exan1ple, 
the classical viev.' of decision n1ak.ing docs not antici­
pate that decisional conflict v.1ill influence the mak­
ing of decisions. Each option, according to the clas­
sical viev.', is assigned a subjective value, or "utility," 
and the person then proceeds to choose the option 
assigned the highest utility. A direct consequence of 
this account is that offering more alternatiYes is al\vays 
a good thing, since the more options there are, the 
more likely is the consumer to find one that proves 
sufficiently attractive. 
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In contrast to this model, behavioral research sug­
gests that, since pretCrences tend to be constructed 
in the context of decision, choices can prove difficult 
to make. People often search for a con1pclling ratio­
nale for choosing one option over another. Whereas 
sometimes a compelling reason can be articulated, at 
other' tin1cs no easy rationale presents itself� render­
ing the conflict ber.veen options hard to resolve. Such 
conflict can lead to the postponing of decision or to 
a passiYe resort to a "default" option and can gener­
ate prefCrence patterns that are fundamentally dit1Cr­
ent fron1 those predicted by accounts based on value 
maximization. In particular, the addition of options 
can excessively complicate (and, thus, ''\\•orsen ") the 
offered set, v.·hcreas the normative rational choice as­
sumption is that added options only make things bet­
ter (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Shafir, Simonson, and 
Tversky, 1993; Tversky and Shafir, 1992 ) .  
In one study, for example, expert physicians had 
to decide about medication tOr a patient \Vith osteo­
arthritis. These physicians \\'ere more likely to de­
cline prescribing a ne\v medication when they had 
to choose bet\veen tv.'O nev.· medications than \Vhcn 
only one nev.1 medication \Vas available (Rcdeln1eier 
and Shafir, 1995 ). The difficulty of choosing ber.veen 
the t\VO medications presumably led son1c physicians 
to recon1n1end not starting either. A sin1ilar pattern 
was documented \vi th shoppers in an upscale grocery 
store, where tasting booths of1Cred the opportunity 
to taste 6 different jan1s in one condition, or any of24 
ja1ns in the second condition. ()f those \vho stopped 
to taste, 30% proceeded to purchase a jam in the 6-
jams condition, \Vhereas nlore stopped but only 3% 
purchased a jam in the 24-jam condition (Iyengar 
and Lepper, 2000).  Of even greater relevance to the 
topic at hand, Iyengar, Jiang, and Huberman (2004) 
shov.,cd that en1ployees' participation in 40l(k) plans 
drops as the number of fund options nladc available 
by their employer increases. 
Bertrand et al. (2010) conducted a field experi­
ment v.'ith a local lender in South Africa to assess the 
relative in1portance of various subtle psychological 
nlanipulations in the decision to take up a loan offer. 
Clients were sent letters offering large, short-term 
loans at randomly assigned interest rates. In addi­
tion, several psychological fCatures on the oftCr letter 
\Vere also independently randomized, one of v.·hich 
\Vas the number of sample loans shcnvn: the otTer let­
ters displayed either one exa1nple of a loan size and 
term, along with respective nlonthly repayments, 
or it displayed tOur such examples. In contrast \Vith 
standard economic thinking and in line \Vith conflict­
bascd predictions, higher take -up \Vas observed under 
the one-option description than under the nlultiple­
options version. "fhe nlagnitudc of this effCct v.'as 
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large: relati\'e to the multiple-options version, the 
single-option description had the same positive etfcct 
on take-up as dropping the n1onthly interest on these 
loans by 1nore than 2 percentage points. 
Mental Accounting 
In their intuitive mental accounting .schemes, people 
compartmentalize \vealth and spending into dis­
tinct budget categories, such as savings, rent, and 
entertainn1ent, and into separate mental accounts, 
such as current incon1e, assets, and fUtl1re inco1ne 
(Thaler, 1985; 1992). c:ontrary to standard fungi­
bility assumptions, people exhibit diflCrent degrees 
of willingness to spend fro1n their diverse accounts. 
(�ompartn1entalization can scr\'C useful functions in 
managing one's behavior, but it also can yield con­
sumption patterns that are overly dependent on cur­
rent income and sensitive to labels, \Vhich can lead to 
saving (at lo\V interest rates) and borro\ving (at higher 
rates) at the same time (Ausubel, 1991). 
An understanding of such proclivities 1nay help 
fir1ns design instruments that bring about more desir­
able outcomes. For instance, with respect to retire­
n1ent saving, the tendency to spend one's savings is 
lo,ver \vhcn monies are not in transaction accounts. 
And faulty plann ing, distraction, and procrastina­
tion all account fOr the persistent findings that saving 
works best as a default. l)articipation in 40l(k) plans 
is significantly higher \Vhen en1ployers otler automatic 
enrollment (Madrian and Shea, 2001), and because 
participants tend to retain the default contribution 
rates and have an easier time co1nmitting no\V to a 
costly step in the future, savings can be increased as a 
result of agreeing to increased deductions from future 
raises (Benartzi and Thaler, 2004; sec also Benartzi, 
Peleg, and Thaler, this volume). 
Knowledge and Attention 
Standard theory assumes that consumers are atten­
tive and kno,vledgeable and typically able to gauge 
and avail the1nselves of in1portant infOrmation. In 
contrast, research suggests that n1any individuals 
lack kno\vledge of relevant options, program rules, 
benefits, and opportunities, and not only among the 
poor or the uneducated. Surveys show that less than 
one-fifth of investors (in stocks, bonds, funds, or 
other securities) can be considered "financially liter­
ate" (Alexander, Jones, and Nigro, 1998), and sin1ilar 
findings describe the understanding sho\Vn by pen­
sion plan participants (Schultz, 1995 ). Indeed, even 
olJer beneficiaries often do not knott' lvhat kind of 
pension they are set to receive, or tt'hat mix of stocks 
and bonds are held in their retirement accounts 
(1.usardi, Mitchell, and C:urto, 2009). 
The amount of information people can and do at­
tend to is limited. Moreover, cognitive l<)ad has been 
shown to aff<:ct pertOrmancc in everyday tasks. To the 
extent that consumers find the1nselves in challenging 
situations that are unfamiliar, tense, or distracting, all 
of '"'hich consume cognitive resources, less focused 
attention will be available to process the inforination 
that is relevant to the decision at hand. This, in turn, 
can render decision n1aking even n1ore dependent on 
situational cues and peripheral considerations, all the 
more so fOr "lov..r literate'' participants, \vho tend to 
experience even greater difficulties with eftOrt versus 
accuracy trade-offs, show overdependence on peri1)h­
eral cues, and tend toward a systcn1atic lvithdrawal 
from many n1arkct interactions (Adkins and Ozannc, 
2005 ). 
r nformation cannot be thought ofas naturally yield­
ing knowledge, and knowledge cannot be assun1ed to 
generate the requisite behavior. People often do not 
fully process data that is i1nminently available because 
of Jimitations in attention, understanding, perceived 
relevance, misremen1bering, or misforccasting its in1-
pact. This is often underappreciatcd by program de­
signers, tt'ho tend to believe that people will kno\V 
that \vhich is in1portant and kno\vable. In sumn1ary, 
for participants \Vith li1nited cognitive resources­
whose decisions are heavily dependent on insufficient 
kno\vledge, perceived norms, automatic defaults, and 
other n1inor contextual nuances-regulation merits 
even greater attention \\'ith regard to nuanced behav­
ioral factors. 
The Power of Institutions 
The substantial influence of context on behavior in1-
plies, arnong other things, that institutions \viii come 
to play a central role in shaping ho\v people think and 
\Vhat they do. By institutions, \Ve n1can forn1al lav ..·s 
and rules, firn1s and other organizations, structures 
and govern1nents, and \videspread market practices 
(see, e.g., Sherraden and Barr, 2005 ) . A1nong other 
things, 
1. Institutions shape defaults, tJ1e "favored" start­
ing point. It is 110\v \Vell established that defaults 
can have a profOund influence on the outco1nes of 
individual choices. Data available on decisions rang­
ing fro1n rctiren1ent savings and porttOlio choices ro 
the decision to be a \\'illing organ donor illustrate the 
substantial increase in n1arket share of default options 
(Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Johnson et al., 1993; 
see in this volume, Johnson and Goldstein; Benartzi, 
Peleg, and l"haler). Contrary to a vicv.' \vherc the 
default is just one of a number of alternatives, in re­
ality defaults persist. This persistence not only sten1s 
from confusion about available options, procrastina­
tion, forgetting, and other sources of inaction, but 
also may be fostered because the default is perceived 
as the most popular option (often a self-fulfilling 
prophecy), is in1plicitly recomn1endcd by experts, or 
is endorsed by the government. 
2. Institutions shape behavior. Many lo\v-inco1nc 
families are, de facto, savers, \vhether or not they re­
sort to banks. But the availability of institutions to 
help foster savings can n1ake a big difference (Barr, 
2004; Berry, 2004). Without the help of a financial 
institution, people's savings are at risk (including 
tfon1 theft, impulse spending, and the needs of other 
household 1nen1bcrs ), savings grow more slo\vly, and 
they may not be available as an emergency cushion 
or to support access to reasonably priced credit in 
ti1nes of need. Institutions provide safety, guidance, 
and control. In circumstances of momentary need, 
ten1ptati(Jn, distraction, or limited self-control, those 
savers who are unbanked arc likely to find it all the 
n1ore difficult to succeed on the path to !ong-tcrn1 
financial stability. 
C:onsider, for exan1ple, two individuals vvith no 
access to credit cards: one has her paycheck directly 
deposited into a savings account, and the other does 
not. Whereas cash is not readily available to the first 
person, \Vho needs to take active steps to withdra\v it, 
cash is im1nediately available to the second, ¥.'ho n1ust 
take active n1easures to save it. The greater tendency 
to spend cash in the \Valier compared to funds de­
posited in the bank (Thaler, 1999) suggests that the 
first, ha11ked person \viJJ spend less on impulse and 
save more easily than the person \Vho is unbanked. 
Holding risk- and savings-related propensities con­
stant, the first person is likely to end up a nlore active 
and efficient saver than the second, due to nothing 
but a seen1ingly minor institutional arrangen1ent. 
Direct deposit is an institution that can have a pro­
found effCct on saving. A recent survey conducted by 
the Atnerican Payroll Association (2002) suggests that 
American employees arc gaining confidence in direct 
deposit as a reliable method of pay1nent that gives 
the1n greater control over their finances, and that e1n­
ployers are recognizing direct deposit as a lo\v-cost 
employee benefit that can also save payroll processing 
time and money. 1'he en1ployers of the poor, in con­
trast, often do not require nor propose electronic sal­
ary payments. Instead, they prefCr not to offer direct 
deposit to hourly/nonexen1pt en1ployces, temporary 
or seasonal en1ployees, part-timers, union e1nployees, 
and en1p1oyees in remote locations, all categories that 
correlate \.Vith being lo\v paid. The most frequently 
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stated reasons for not oftCring direct deposit to these 
en1ployees include lack of processing time to meet 
standard industry (Automated Clearing House) re­
quirements, high turnover, and union contract re­
strictions. All this constitutes a n1issed opportunity 
to offer favorable access to direct c_leposit for needy 
individuals, "-'hose de facto default consists of going 
after hol1rs to cash their modest check fOr a hefty fCc. 
3. Institutions provide implicit planning. As it 
turns out, a variety of institutions provide in1plicit 
planning, often in \Vays that address potential behav­
ioral weaknesses. Credit card companies send custon1-
ers timely reminders of due payn1ents, and clients can 
elect to have their utility bills automatically charged, 
allov,ring them to avoid late fCes if occasionally they 
do not get around to paying in ti1ne. 1'he lo\\'-income 
buyer, on the other hand, without the credit card, the 
automatic billing, or the \Veb-based rcn1inders, risks 
missed payments, late tCes, disconnected utilities (fi)l­
lowed by high reconnection charges), etc. In fact, 
institutions can also sabotage planning, for exan1ple, 
by providing debt too easily. Temporal discounting 
in general and present bias in particular can be ex­
ploited to make i1nn1ediate cash 1nore attractive than 
any n1enacing future costs. 
A behavioral analysis yields ne\v appreciation for 
the i1npact of institutions, \1\'hich affect people's lives 
by, an1ong other things, easing their planning, help­
ing them transform their intentions into actions, or 
enabling their resistance to temptation. c:onsider 
again the case of a lo\v-incon1e household. Having 
little slack, lo\v-income households c:annot readily 
cut back consun1ption in the flee of an unanticipated 
need or shock (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2009). When 
they do cut back, it is often on essentials. In n1any 
instances, cutting back means paying late, and paying 
late means incurring costly late fees, utility or phone 
reconnection tees (Edin and Lein, 1997), and seri­
ous disruptions to work, education, and family litC. 
In other cases it means costly short-tern1 borro\ving 
to avoid those consequences. In principle, the lack of 
slack should provide lo\v-incon1e households a strong 
incentive to increase their buffCr-stock savings to cope 
\Vith a volatile environn1ent. Yet such households tend 
to have negligible liquid savings, in part because the 
financial systen1 makes it difficult for thcn1 to get ac­
cess to affordable savings vehicles (Barr, 2004). 
financial services may provide an i1nportant path­
'\Vay Ollt of poverty. Such services facilitate savings to 
mitigate shocks and promote asset development, and 
they facilitate borro\ving to purchase higher-cost du­
rables or to help weather tough times. In short, finan­
cial services allovv individuals to sm(JOth consumption 
and invest. ln1provement of financial services, then, 
444 • DECISION CONTEXTS 
provides t\\·o key advantages. first, for individu­
als \vho have access to financial services, i1nprove­
n1cnt \vould lo\vcr the costs they pay. For example, 
i1nproved financial services 1nay enable thc1n to use 
a credit card rather than a n1ore expensive payday 
lender. Second, individuals \Vho have not had access 
to financial services v.·ould get the direct benefits of 
access, such as the ability ro borro\v to s1nooth shocks 
(e.g., an illness, job loss, or divorce). 
Access to financial institutions allo\vs people to im­
prove their planning by keeping money out of temp­
tation's \vay. Din.:ct deposit and auto1natic deductions 
c.111 ren1ove the in1n1ediate availability of cash and put 
in place auton1atic sa\'ings. Financial institutions can 
111ake it easy fOr individuals to inake infrequent, care­
fully considered financial accounting decisions that 
can pro\'e resistant to occasional intuiti\'e error or to 
n101nentary in1pulse. In this sense, improved financial 
institutions can have a disproportionate i1npact on the 
lives of the poor. Moving fro1n a payday lender and a 
check casher to a bank v.·ith direct deposit and payroll 
deduction can have benefits in the t()rm of in1proved 
planning, saving, tc1nptation a\'oidance, and other 
outco1nes fJ.r inore important than the transaction 
costs saved. 
Behavior, Markets, and Policy: 
A Conceptual Framework 
A behavioral perspective pro\'ides a better account of 
ho\\' individuals niake decisions and is thus a useful 
correcti\'e to the rational agent n1odel. Yet a niodel 
focused on individuals is, on its O\\'n, inco1nplete as a 
basis for policy. "fhe perspective outlined above needs 
to be e1nbedded in the logic of niarkets. A frame\vork 
is required that takes into account firms' incenti\'es 
\Vith respect to indi\'idual behavior as \vell as to regu­
lation. This perspective produces t\VO din1ensions 
to consider: firms' interactions \Vith consumers, and 
fir1ns' interactions \Vith regulators. 
As tOr the first, the psychological biases of indi­
viduals can either be aligned \Vith, or in opposition to, 
the interest of firn1s that 1narket products or services. 
Consider a cons1.1n1er •vho does not fully appreciate 
the profOund etlects of the co1npounding of interest. 
This consu1ner \\'Ould be prone both to undersave and 
to overborro\v. And both the consun1er and society 
\\'otdd pretCr that he did not have such a bias in both 
contexts. Firn1s, tOr their part, \vould also prefer that 
the individual not have the bias to undersave, so that 
funds intended tOr invest1nent and fOr fee generation 
\Votild not di1ninish (abstracting from tee structures). 
Ho\vever, at least over the short ter1n, firms \\'ould be 
perfectly content to see the same individual overbor­
ro\v (abstracting from collection costs). 
\-Vith regard to the second din1ension, the market 
response to individual f"iilure can profoundly affect 
regulation. In attempting to boost participation in 
40l(k) retiren1ent plans, for example, the regulator 
faces at \\'Orst indifferent and at best positively in­
clined employers and financial firins.1 With respect 
to credit, by contrast, firms often have strong inccn­
ti\'es to exacerbate psychological biases by f"iiling to 
highlight the costs of borro•ving. Regulation in this 
case f3ces a niuch 1norc difficult challenge than in the 
savings situation. In forcing the disclosure of hidden 
prices of credit, the regulator often faces uncoopera­
tive firms, whose interests are to find ways to \vork 
ar()und or undo regulatory interventions. 
The inode of regulation chosen should take ac­
count of this interaction benveen firms and individu­
als and behveen firn1s and regulators. One might 
think of the regulator as holding t\vo kinds of levers, 
\.Vhich we describe as changing the rules and chang­
ing the scoring. 2 When fr>rcing disclosure of the APR, 
for example, the regulator effectively changes the 
"rules" of the gan1e: •vhat a firm niust say. A stronger 
fOrm of rule change is product regulation: changing 
v.rhat a firm must do. Behavioral rule changes, such 
as creating a favored starting position or default, fall 
some\vhere in bet\veen. When imposing liability, by 
contrast, the regulator changes the \Vay the game 
is '�scored." Liability levels can be set, in theory, to 
match or exceed the gains to the firm fron1 engag­
ing in the disfavored activity. Scoring can also be 
changed, fOr exan1ple, by providing tax incentives to 
engage in the favored activity or by imposing negative 
tax consequences tOr engaging in a disfJ.\'ored activ­
ity. Typically, changing the rules of the gan1c (\Vi th out 
changing the scoring) alters certain behaviors \vhile 
maintaining the firms' original incentives; changing 
the scoring of the game can alter those incentives. 
Understanding the interaction ben.veen individu­
als, firms, and regulators in particular markets high­
lights the care that inust be taken \vhen transferring 
behasioral economic insights from one domain to an­
other. For example, the insights of the n1ost prominent 
example of behavioral regulation-setting defaults in 
401 (k) participation-ought not to be mindlessly ap­
plied to other markets. Changing the rules on retire­
n1ent saving by introducing defJ.ults \vorks well be­
cause en1ployers' incenti\'es align (or do not niisalign) 
with regulatory etlOrts to guide individual choice. In 
other \VOrds, under current conditions, employers are 
unatfected, or may even be hurt, by individuals' pro­
pensity to undersave in 40l(k) plans.3 Consequently, 
they will not lean against attempts to fix that problem. 
In other instances, \vhere firms' incentives misalign 
\Vith regulatory intent, changing the rules alone n1ay 
not \Vork since those firms have strong incentives to 
\\'Ork creatively around those changes. Interestingly, 
such circumstances may lead to regulations, such as 
'"changing the scoring" with liability, which, although 
deeply motivated by behavioral considerations, are 
not themselves particularly psychological in nature. 
That is, given market responses, rules based on subtle 
attempts to influence individual psychology, for ex­
ample through defaults or framing, may be too v.,reak, 
and changes in liability rules or other measures may 
prove necessary. 
The distinction in market responses to individual 
psychology is central to our framework and is illus­
trated in table 26.1. In some cases, the market is ei­
ther neutral or v.,rants to overcome consumer fallibility. 
In other cases, the market would like to exploit or 
exaggerate consumer fallibility. When consumers mis­
understand compounding of interest in the context of 
saving, banks have incentives to reduce this misunder­
standing so as to increase deposits. When consumers 
misunderstand compounding in the context of bor­
rowing, lenders may lack the incentive to correct this 
misunderstanding because they can induce consumers 
to overborrow in \vays that maintain or enhance prof­
itability, at least over market-relevant time horizons.4 
When consun1ers procrastinate in signing up for the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (and hence in filing for 
taxes), private tax preparation firms have incentives to 
help remove this procrastination so as to increase their 
customer base. When consu1ners procrastinate in re­
turning rebates (but make retail purchases intending 
to get a rebate), retailers benefit. Note the parallelism 
in these exan1ples: firms' incentives to alleviate or ex­
ploit a bias are not an intrinsic feature of the bias itself 
Instead, they are a function of how the bias plays itself 
out in the particular market structure. 
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In the consumer credit market, one \.vorrics that 
many interactions between individuals and firms are 
of the kind where fir1ns seek to exploit, rather than al­
leviate, bias. If true, this raises the concern of overex­
trapolating from the 40l(k) defaults example to credit 
products. To the extent that 40l(k) defaults work 
because the optimal behavior is largely aligned v.:ith 
market incentives, other areas, such as credit markets, 
might be more difficult to regulate \Vith n1erc de­
faults. Furthermore, if the credit nlarket is dominated 
by "lov..'-road" fir1ns offering opaque products that 
"prey" on human v..reakness, it is more likely that regu­
lators of such a market will be captured because "high 
road" interests with small market share will tend to be 
too weak politically to push back against the bigger 
low-road players. Market forces will then defeat weak 
positive interventions, such as the setting of defaults, 
and low-road players will continue to don1inate. Many 
observers, for example, believe that credit card mar­
kets were, at least prior to passage of the c:ARD Act 
in 2009, dominated by such lo\v-road practices (see, 
e.g., Bar-Gill, 2004; Mann, 2007). If government 
policy makers want to attempt to use defaults in such 
contexts, they might need to deploy "stickier" defaults 
(namely, ones that might prove costly to abandon) or 
other more aggressive policy options. 
In our conceptual approach to the issue of regu­
latory choice (table 26.2 ), the regulator can either 
change the rules of the game or change the scoring 
of the game. Setting a default is an example of chang­
ing the rules of the gan1e, as is disclosure regulation. 
The rules of the gan1e are changed \vhen there is 
an attempt to change the nature of the interactions 
benveen individuals and firms, as when the regula­
tion attempts to affect \vhat can be said, offered, or 
done Changing the scoring of the game, by contrast, 
changes the payoffs a firm will receive for particular 
outcomes. This may be done \Vithout a particular rule 
Table 26.1 The firm and the individual 
Behavioral fallibility Market neutral and/or wants to 
overcome consumer fallibility 
Consumers mis.inderstand Consumers misunderstand 
compounding compounding in savings 
Consumers procrastinate 
---)- Banks would like to reduce 
this to increase savings base 
Consumers procrastinate in 
signing up for EITC 
---)- Tax filing companies would 
like to reduce this so as to 
increase number of customers 
Market exploits consumer fallibility 
Consumers misunderstand 
compounding in borrowing 
---)- Banks would like to exploit 
this to increase borrowing 
Consumers procrastinate in 
returning rebates 
---)- Retailers would like to exploit 
this to increase revenues 
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Rules 
Scoring 
Table 26.2 Changing the game 
Set the defaults in 401(k) savings 
Opt-out rule for organ donation 
Penalties for 40l(k) enrollment top 
heavy with high-salary employees 
Grants to states that enroll organ donors 
about how the outcome is to be achieved. For cx­
a1nplc, pension regulation that penalizes firn1s whose 
401(k) plan enrolhnent is top-heavy \Vith high-paid 
executives is an example of how scoring gives firms 
incentives to enroll low-income individuals \vithout 
setting particular rules on ho\V this is done. (:hanging 
rules and changing scoring often accompany each 
other, but they are conceptually distinct. 
Table 26.3 weaves these approaches together, il­
lustrating our conceptual framework for behaviorally 
informed regulation. The table shows how regula� 
tory choice may be analyzed according to the 1nar­
ket's stance to\vard human fallibility. On the left side 
of the table, market incentives align reasonably well 
with society's goal of overcoming consumer fallibil­
ity. Rules in that context may have a relatively lighter 
touch. For example, using auton1atic savings plans as 
a default in retirement saving, or providing tOr licens­
ing and registration to ensure that standard practices 
are tOllo'\ved. Sin1ilarly, scoring on the left side of the 
table might involve tax incentives to reduce the costs 
to firms of engaging in behaviors that align well with 
their market interests and the public interest but may 
Table 26.3 Behaviorally informed regulation 
Market neutra I and/ Market exploits 
or wants to overcome consumer fallibility 
consumer fallibility 
Rules Public education Sticky defaults 
on saving (opt-out mortgage or 
credit card) 
Direct deposiU Information debiasing 
auto-save (payoff time and cost for 
credit cards) 
Licensing 
Scoring Tax incentives for Ex post liability standard 
savings vehicles for truth in lending 
Direct deposit Broker duty of care and 
tax-refund accounts changing compensation 
practices (yield spread 
premiums) 
other\vise be too costly. On the right side of the table, 
by contrast, 1narket incentives are largely nlisaligned 
'\Vi th the public interest in overcoming consumer falli­
bility. In that context, rule changes will typically need 
to be more substantial to be effective and may need to 
be combined with changing the scoring. 
The discussion that fOllows illustrates the chal­
lenge to policies in the top right-hand corner of ta­
ble 26.3. Changing the rules of the game alone v,.ril\ 
often be insufficient when firn1s are highly motivated 
to find \vork-arounds. As such, merely setting a de­
fault�in contrast to defaults deployed in markets on 
the left side of the table-will likely not \Vork. "fhus, 
when '\Ve suggest opt-out policies in mortgages belo\v, 
the challenge will be to find ways to 1nake these start­
ing positions "sticky" so that firms do not easily undo 
their defJ.ult nature. In such cases, achieving an ef­
fective default may require separating low-road tfo1n 
high-road firms and making it profitable fOr high­
road firn1s to offer the default product (for a related 
concept, sec Kennedy, 2005). For that to \\'ork, the 
default must be sufficiently attractive to consun1ers, 
sufficiently profitable tOr high-road firms to succeed 
in oftCring it, and the penalties associated \Vith devia­
tions ti-om the default must be sufficiently costly so as 
to make the detault stick even in the tace of nlarket 
pressures from low-road firn1s. In so1ne credit mar­
kets, lo\v-road firn1s may becon1e so do1ninant that 
sticky detaults \Viii be ineffectual. Moreover, achieving 
such a detault is likely to be costlier than making de­
faults V.'ork v.'hen market incentives align, not least be­
cause the costs associated \Vith the stickiness of the de­
tault involve greater dead-1,veight losses due to higher 
costs to opt out tOr those fOr \vhom deviating fron1 
the default is opti1nal. Such losses v.'ould need to be 
\Veighed against the losses fron1 the current system, 
as well as against losses from alternative approaches, 
such as disclosure or product regulation. Nonetheless, 
given the considerations above, it see1ns V.'Orth ex­
ploring \vhether sticky detJ.ults can help to transform 
consumer financial nlarkets in certain contexts. 
Sticky defaults are one of a set of examples we dis­
cuss as potential regulatory interventions based on 
our proposed conceptual tfa1nework. As noted above, 
given market responses to relevant psychological tJ.c­
tors in different contexts, regulation nlay need to take 
a variety of forms, including so1ne that, v.·hile perhaps 
infOrn1ed by psychology, are designed not to affCct 
behavioral change but rather to alter the market struc­
ture in \vhich the relevant choices are 1nade. (�iven 
the complexities involved, our purpose here is not to 
champion specific proposals but rather to illustrate 
ho\v a behaviora!Iy inti:>nned regulatory analysis 1nay 
generate a deeper understanding of the costs and ben­
efits of particular policies. 
Behaviorally Informed Financial Regulation 
Follo\ving Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir (2008a), 
we revie\v a set of ideas to illustrate our conceptual 
framework in three main areas of consumer finance: 
home 1nortgagcs, credit cards, and bank accounts. We 
will use these three substantive areas to explore how 
changing the rules and changing the scoring can af­
fect firms' behavior in market contexts where firms 
have incentives to exploit consumer bias (as in credit) 
and in those where firms have incentives to overcome 
such biases (as in saving). Our analyses map into dif­
ferent quadrants of table 26.3. Since we first pub­
lished our \Vork, there has been significant progress in 
implementing a nun1ber of these ideas. 5 We thcrctOrc 
also discuss ho\\' some of these ideas have been re­
cently in1plemented in the C:ARD Act of 2009, the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010, and other policy initiatives. In addition, 
with the creation of the ne\v Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (C:FPB) in the Dodd-Frank Act, 
there is an opportunity to further learn fro1n behav­
ioral research and to experiment \\'ith nc\V approaches. 
We \vill briefly highlight son1c of these opportunities. 
Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Regulation 
FULL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE TO DEBIAS BORROWERS 
With the advent of nationwide credit reporting sys­
tems and the refinement of credit scoring and n1odel­
ing, the creditor and broker kncnv intOrmation about 
the borrov.rer that the borrO\\'CI does not necessar­
ily kno\V about himself, including not just his credit 
score, but his likely perfOrmance regarding a particu­
lar set of loan products. (�reditors \vill know \Vhether 
the borrower could qualify for a better, cheaper loan, 
as \veil as the likelihood that he \Viii meet his obliga­
tions under the existing mortgage or become delin­
quent, refinance, default, or go into tOreclosure. Yet 
lenders arc not required to reveal this information 
to borro\vers, and the in1pact of this lack of disclo­
sure is probably exacerbated by consun1er beliefS. 
Consu1ners likely have fJ.lse background assumptions 
regarding \\'hat brokers and creditors reveal and the 
implications of their offers. What if consumers believe 
the fOllo\ving: 
Creditors reveal all infOrmation about me and the 
loan products I am qualified to receive. Brokers 
\vork tOr n1e in finding me the best loan for my 
purposes, and lenders offer n1e the best loans for 
\vhich I qualify. I 1nust be qualified frlr the loan I 
have been offered, or the lender \vould not have 
validated the choice by offCring me the loan. 
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Because I am qualified for the loan that must 
mean that the lender thinks that I can repay the 
loan. Why else \Vould they lend 1ne the money? 
Moreover, the government tightly regulates ho1ne 
n1ortgagcs; they make the lender give inc all these 
legal tOrms. Surely the government must regulate 
all aspects of this transaction. 
In reality, the government does not regulate as the 
borro\ver believes, and the lender does not necessar­
ily behave as the borro\ver hopes. Instead, information 
is hidden tfon1 the borro\vcr, inforn1ation that \vould 
improve n1arket competition and outcon1es. Given the 
consun1er's probably false background assumptions 
and the reality of asymmetric infOrmation favoring 
the lender and broker, we suggest that creditors be re­
quired to reveal useful infor1nation to the borro\.ver at 
the time of the mortgage loan otter, including disclo­
sure of the borro\ver's credit score and the borro\ver's 
qualifications tOr the lender's n1ortgage products and 
rates. Such an approach corresponds to the provision 
of debiasing infOrmation, in the top right of table 26.3. 
'fhe goal of these disclosures would be to put pres­
sure on creditors and brokers to be honest in their 
dealings \Vith applicants. The additional inforrna­
tion might improve con1parison shopping and, per­
haps, outcon1es. ()f course, revealing such informa­
tion would also reduce brokers' and creditors' profit 
n1argins. But because the classic market competition 
model relies on full intOrmation and assun1cs ratio­
nal behavior based on understanding, this proposal 
sin1ply attempts to ren1ove n1arkct frictions from in­
forn1ation tJ.ilures and to n1ove n1arket con1petition 
more to\\·ard its ideal. By reducing intOrn1ation asym­
metry, full inforn1ation disclosure \VOtild help debias 
consumers and lead to more con1pctitive outco1nes. 
EX POST STANDARDS-BASED TRUTH IN LENDING 
Optimal disclosure will not occur in all n1arkets 
through con1petition alone because in n1any contexts 
firms have incentives to hide intOrmation about prod­
ucts or prices and because consun1crs \.vi1l not insist 
on con1petition based on transparency due to a lack 
of kno\\1ledge or understanding and a 1nisforecasting 
of their O\VO behavior. (�on1petition under a range of 
plausible scenarios \Vill not necessarily generate psy­
chologically infOrn1ative and actionable disclosure. 
Moreover, even if all firn1s have an incentive to dis­
close in n1eaningful \.Vays, they n1ay not disclose in the 
san1e \vay, thus undermining con1parison shopping by 
consun1ers. If co1npctition does not produce informa­
tive disclosure, disclosure regulation might be neces­
sary. But the mere fact that disclosure regulation 1s 
needed does not n1can that it "-"ill work. 
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A beha\'ioral perspective should focus in part on 
improving the disclosures themselves. The goal of dis­
closure should be to improve the quality of infOrma­
tion about contract terms in meaningful \vays. Simply 
adding information, fbr example, is unlikely to \Vork. 
Disclosure policies are effective to the extent that they 
present a fra1ne-a \vay of parsing the disclosure­
that is both \veil understood and conveys salient in­
formation that helps the decision maker act optimally. 
It is possible, for example, that infonnation about the 
failure frequency of particular products ( "2 out of 10 
borro\vers who take this kind of loan default") rnight 
help, but proper framing can be difficult to achieve 
and to maintain consistently, given that it may vary 
across situations. Moreover, the attempt to in1prove 
decision quality through better consumer under­
standing, which is prcsu1ncd to change consumers' 
intentions, and consequently their actions, is fraught 
\Vith difficulty. There is often a \vide divide between 
understanding, intention, and action. 
Furthcrn1orc, even if meaningful disclosure rules 
can be created, sellers can generally undcn11ine what­
ever ex ante disclosure rule is established, in some 
contexts simply by "complying" with it: "Here's the 
disclosure form I'm supposed to give you, just sign 
here." With rules-based, ex ante disclosure require­
ments, the rule is set up first, and the firm (the dis­
closer) moves last. VVhile an ex ante rule may attempt 
to provide information and facilitate comparison 
shopping, whatever incentives the discloser had to 
confuse consumers persist in the face of the regula­
tion. While officially complying \Vith the rule, there is 
market pressure to find other n1eans to avoid the salu­
tary eftCcts on consumer decisions that the disclosure 
\vas intended to achieve. 
In light of the challenges inherent to addressing 
such issues ex ante, we propose that policy makers 
consider shifting a\vay from sole reliance on a rules­
based, ex ante regulatory structure for disclosure as 
embodied in the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and 
to\vard the integration of an ex post, standards-based 
disclosure requirement in addition. Rather than sole 
reliance on a rule, \Ve would also deploy a standard, 
and rather than sole reliance on an ex ante decision 
about content, \VC \VOtild permit the standard to be 
enforced after the event, for example, after loans are 
made. In essence, courts or the new C�FPB \vould 
deten11ine \vhcther the disclosure '\VOti!d have, under 
con1mon understanding, eflCctively communicated 
the key terms of the mortgage, confonning to some 
minimum standard, to the typical borrower. This ap­
proach could be similar to ex post determinations of 
reasonableness of disclai1ners of \Varranties in sales 
contracts under UCC 2-316 (Unifonn Commercial 
Code; see White and Summers, l 995 ). This type of 
policy intervention \vould correspond to a change in 
"scoring," as in the lo\ver right of table 26.3. 
An ex post version of truth in lending based on 
a reasonable-person standard to complement the 
fixed disclosure rule under TILA inight pern1it 
innovation-both in products themselves and in 
disclosure-while minimizing rule evasion. An ex 
post standard with sufficient teeth could change the 
incentives of firms to confi.1se and would be more dif­
ficult to evade. Under the current approach, creditors 
can easily "evade" Tll.A by simultaneously complying 
\vith its actual tenns \vhile making the required dis­
closures of the tern1s effectively useless in the context 
of borrowing decisions by consun1ers with li1nited at­
tention and understanding. TILA, for example, does 
not block a creditor from introducing a more salient 
term ("lower monthly cost!") to con1pcte \Vith the 
disclosed APR for borrowers' attention. By contrast, 
under an ex post standards approach, lenders could 
not plead mere compliance \Vi th a TILA rule as a de­
fCnse. Rather, the question \VOuld be one of objec­
tive reasonableness: whether the lender meaningfully 
conveyed the information required for a typical con­
sumer to make a reasonable judgment about the Joan. 
Standards would also lo\\-·er the cost of specification 
ex ante. (]arity of contract is hard to specify ex ante 
but easier to verify ex post. Over ti1ne, through agency 
action, guidance, model disclosures, no-action letters, 
and court decisions, the paran1eters of the reasonable­
ness standard \Vould become knov"n and predictable. 
While TILA has significant shortcomings, \Ve do 
not propose abandoning it. Rather, TILA \\'Ould 
remain and could be in1proved with a better under­
standing of consun1er behavior. The Federal Reserve 
Board, fOr example, unveiled major and usefi.11 changes 
to its disclosure rules based on consun1er research.6 
TILA \Vould still be important in setting uniforn1 
rules to permit co1nparison shopping among mort­
gage products, one of its t\VO central goals. Ho\Ve\'er, 
son1c of the burden ofTILA's second goal, to induce 
firms to reveal infiJrn1ation that \vould pro111ote better 
consumer understanding even under circun1stances in 
\vhich the firm believes that it \Vould hurt the firn1, 
\vould be shifted to the ex post standard. 
There would be significant costs to such an ap­
proach, especially at first. Litigation or regulatory 
enfi:)rcemcnt \vould impose direct costs, and the un­
certainty surrounding enfOrcement of the standard ex 
post might deter innovation in the developn1ent of 
mortgage products. The additional costs of compli­
ance with a disclosure standard might reduce lenders' 
\villingness to develop ne\\-' n1ortgage products de­
signed to reach lo\ver-incon1e or n1inority borrO\\'ers 
\Vho might not be served by the firms' "plain vanilla" 
products.7 The lack of clear rules 1night also increase 
consumer confusion regarding ho\v to co1npare inno­
vative mortgage products to each other, even \\'hile 
it increases consumer understanding of the products 
being offered. Ultimately, if consumer confusion re­
sults mostly from firm obfuscation, then our proposal 
\Vill likely help a good deal. By contrast, if consumer 
confusion in this context results n1ostly tl-om market 
con1plexity in product innovation, then the proposal 
is unlikely to make a major difference and other ap­
proaches focused on loan comparisons might be \Var­
ranted (see, e.g., Thaler and Sunstcin, 2008, this 
volume). 
Despite the shortco1nings of an ex post standard 
for truth in lending, \Ve believe that such an approach 
is \.VOrth pursuing. To limit the costs associated \Vith 
our approach, the ex post detern1ination of reason­
ableness could be significantly confined. For exa1nple, 
if courts are to be involved in enforcement, the ex 
post standard tOr reasonableness of disclosure 1night 
be limited to providing a (partial) defense to full pay-
1nent in foreclosure or bankruptcy, rather than being 
open to broader enforcen1ent through affirmative suits 
tOr damages. Alternatively, rather than court enforce­
ment, the ex post standard might be applied solely 
by the C:FPB through supervision. Furthermore, the 
ex post exposure 1night be significantly reduced 
through ex ante steps. For exan1ple, the CFPB might 
develop safe harbors for reasonable disclosures, issue 
n1odcl disclosures, or use no-action letters to provide 
certainty to lenders. Moreover, firms might be tasked 
with conducting regular surveys of borrowers or con­
ducting experimental design research to validate their 
disclosures; results from the research demonstrat­
ing a certain level of consun1er understanding might 
provide a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness 
or even a safe harbor ffom challenge:s �fhe key is to 
give the standard sufficient teeth without deterring 
innovation. The precise contours of enforce1nent and 
liability arc not essential to the concept, and \veigh­
ing the costs and benefits of such penalties, as \Veil as 
detailed implementation design, are beyond the scope 
of introdL1cing the idea here. 
STICKY OPT-OUT MORTGAGE REGULATION 
While the causes of the n1ortgage crisis are myriad� a 
central problen1 \Vas that many borro\vers took out 
loans that they did not understand and could not af· 
tOrd. Brokers and lenders offered loans that looked 
much less expensive than they really \Vere, because 
of lo\.v initial monthly payments and hidden, costly 
features. Families comn1only make n1istakes in tak­
ing out hon1e mortgages because they are misled by 
broker sa1es tactics, n1isunderstand the complicated 
tern1s and financial tradcoffs in mortgages, \vrongly 
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tOrecast their O\Vn behavior, and 1nisperceive their risk 
of borro\ving. Ho\\' many hon1eo\vners really under­
stand ho\v the teaser rate, introductory rate, and reset 
rate relate to the London Interbank Offered Rate 
plus son1e specified margin, or ho\v many can judge 
\vhether the prepayment penalty \vill offSet the gains 
fron1 a teaser rate? 
Altering the rules of the game of disclosure, and 
altering the "scoring" fr>r seeking to evade proper 
disclosure, n1ay be sufficient to reduce the \vorst out­
comes. However, if market pressures and consun1er 
confusion arc sufficiently strong, such disclosure n1ay 
not be enough. If market complexity is sufficiently 
disruptive to consu1ner choice, product regulation 
1night prove most appropriate. for example, by bar­
ring prepayn1ent penalties, one couki reduce lock-ins 
to bad 1nortgages; by barring short-tern1 ARMs and 
balloon payments, one could reduce the pressure to 
refinance; in both cases, more of the cost of the loan 
\vould be pushed into interest rates, and competition 
could focus on an explicitly stated price in the form 
of the APR. Such price competition \Vould benefit 
consumers, \vho \vould be nlore likely to understand 
the tcrn1s on \vhich lenders \Vere competing. Product 
regulation \.vould also reduce cognitive and emotional 
pressures related to potentially bad decision 1naking 
by reducing the nun1ber of choices and eliminating 
loan teatures that put pressure on borro\vers to re­
finance on bad terms. Ho\.vever, product regulation 
may stifle beneficial innovation, and there is ahvays 
the possibility that the government may simply get 
it \vrong, prohibiting good products and permitting 
bad ones. 
For that reason, \Ve proposed a nc\.v form of rcg­
ulation.9 We proposed that a default be established 
\Vith increased liability exposure tOr deviations that 
harm consumers. For lack of a better term, \Ve called 
this a sticky opt-out mortgage systcn1. A sticky opt­
out systcn1 \vould fall, in ter1ns of stri11gency, bet\.Vecn 
product regulation and disclosure. For reasons \.\'e 
\.vill explain belo\\·, n1arket tOrces \vould likely s\.va1np 
a pure opt-out regime-that is \vhcrc the need tOr 
stickiness came in. "fhis approach corresponds to a 
combination of changing the rules of the gan1e (top 
right of table 26.3), .1nd changing liability standards 
(botton1 right of that table). 
'fhe proposal is grounded in our equilibriun1 
nlodel of incentives frlr firms and of indiYidual psy­
chology. Many borro\vers may be unable to co1nparc 
complex loan products and act optimally for then1-
selves based on such an understanding (see, e.g., 
Ausubel, 1991). We thus deploy an opt-out stratet,'Y 
to make it easier tOr borrowers to choose a standard 
product and harder tOr then1 to choose a product 
they are less likely to understand. At the same tin1c, 
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lenders 1nay seek to extract surplus from borro\vers 
because of asymn1ctric intOrmation about future in­
co1nc or dctiult probabilities (Musto, 2007), and, in 
the short tenn, lenders and brokers may benefit tfom 
selling bornnvcrs loans they cannot afford. Thus, a 
pure dctJ.ult v-.rould be undennincd by the firms, and 
regulation needs to take account of this market pres­
sure by pushing back. 
Tn our 1nodel, lenders \vould be required to offer 
eligible borro,vcrs a standard mortgage (or set of 
1nortgages), such as a fixed-rate, sclf-an1ortizing 
thirty-year n1ortgage loan or a standard ARM: prod­
Lh.-t according to reasonable undcr\vriting standards. 
The pn.:cisc contours of the standard set of mortgages 
\vould be set by regulation. Lenders \vould be free 
to charge \vhatevcr interest rate they \vanted on the 
loan and, subject to the constraints outlined belo\v, 
could ofter \vhatever other loan products they \\'anted 
outside of the standard package. Borrowers, however, 
\vould get the standard mortgage otlCred, unless they 
chose to opt out in tJ.vor of a nonstandard option ot: 
fered by the lender, after honest and con1prchensibk: 
disclosures fron1 brokers or lenders about the tern1s 
and risks of the alternative mortgages. An opt-out 
tnortgage syste111 \vould n1ean borrowers \vould be 
tnore likely to get straightfor\\'ard loans they could 
understand. 
Rut a plain-vanilla opt-out policy is likely to be in­
adequate. Unlike the savings context, \vherc market 
incentives align \Veil \Vith policies to overcon1e be­
havioral biases, in the context of credit 111arkets, firms 
ofren have an incentive to hide the true costs of bor­
ro\ving. Given the strong market pressures to devi­
ate tfon1 the detJ.ult oftCr, \\'e \Vould need to require 
111ore than a si111ple opt-out to 111ake the defJ.ult stick. 
Deviation fron1 the offer \vould require heightened 
disclosures and additional legal exposure for lenders 
in order to make the detJult sticky. Under our plan, 
lenders \vould have stronger incentives to provide 
n1eaningful disclosures to those \vhon1 they convince 
to opt out, because they \\'ould face increased regula­
tory scrutiny or increased costs if the loans did not 
\Vork out. 
future \vork v.·ill need to explore in greater de­
tail the entOrce1nent mechanism. for exan1ple, under 
one potential approach to 1naking the opt-out sticky, 
if detJ.ult occurs after a bornl\ver has opted out, the 
borro\ver could raise the lack of reasonable disclosure 
as a defense to bankruptcy or fOreclosure. Using an 
objective reasonableness standard akin to that used 
tOr \\'arranty analysis under the UnitOrn1 Commercial 
c:ode,111 if the court detern1ined that the disclosure 
\vould not effectively con1n1unicate the key tenns 
and risks of the mortgage to the typical borro\ver, 
the court could modit)r the loan contract. Although 
Congress rejected this proposal in the Dodd-Frank 
Act, if Congress \Vere to revisit the issue, it could au­
thorize the CFPB to entOrce the require1nent on a 
supervisory basis rather than relying on the courts. 
The agency would be responsible for supervising the 
disclosures according to a reasonableness standard 
and would impose a fine on the lender and order 
corrective actions if the disclosures were tOund to be 
unreasonable. "fhe precise nature of the stickiness re­
quired and the trade-oftS involved in imposing these 
costs on lenders would need to be explored in greater 
detail, but in principle, a sticky opt-out policy could 
eftCctively leverage the behavioral insight that detJ.ults 
matter with the industrial organizational insight that 
market incentives V.'ork against the advantages of a 
pure opt-out policy in n1any credit markets. 
An opt-out mortgage system \vith stickiness might 
provide several benefits over current market outcon1es. 
For one, a "plain vanilla" set \Vould be easier to com­
pare across mortgage offers. IntOrmation \vould be 
more efficiently transmitted across the market. Con­
sumers would be likely to understand the key terms 
and features of such standardized products better 
than they \vould alternative n1ortgage products. Price 
con1petition \Vott!d be more salient once the features 
\Vere standardized. Behaviorally, when alternative, 
"non-vanilla" products are introduced, the consumer 
\vould be made <.n.vare that these represent deviations 
from the dctJ.ult, anchoring consumers on the de­
tJ.ult product and providing some basic expectations 
tOr \vhat ought to enter into the choice. Fran1ing the 
mortgage choice as one bet\veen accepting standard 
n1ortgage otfers and needing affirn1atively to choose 
a nonstandard product should improve consumer 
decision making. Creditors \vill be required to make 
heightened disclosures about the risks of alternative 
loan products, subject to legal sanction in the event 
of failure to reasonably disclose such risks; the legal 
sanctions should deter creditors tfom making highly 
unreasonable alternative offers \Vi th hidden and con1-
plicatcd tenns. c:onsumcrs may be less likely to make 
significant n1istakes. In contrast to a pure product reg­
ulation approach, the sticky default approach alknvs 
lenders to continue to develop ne\v kinds of mort­
gages, but only v.:hen they can adequately explain key 
terms and risks to borro\vers. 
Moreover, requiring a default acco1npanied by 
heightened disclosures and increased legal exposure 
tOr deviations 1nay help boost high-road lending rela­
tive to lo\v-road lending-at least if deviations result­
ing in harm are appropriately penalized. If offering an 
opt-out mortgage product helps to split the n1arket 
bet\veen high- and lov,.r-road firms and re\vards the 
fonner, the 1narket 1nay shift (back) to\vard finns that 
ofter home mortgage products that better serve bor­
ro\vers. For this to \York effectively, the default-and 
etlorts to make it sticky-should enable the consumer 
easily to distinguish the typical "good'� loan, benefit­
ing both lender and borrov.'er, from a \vide range of 
"'bad" loans that benefit the lender \Vith higher rates 
and fees but harm the borrov,rer; that benefit the bor­
rower but harm the lender; or that harn1 borrower 
and lender but benefit third parties, such as brokers. 
There will be costs associated with requiring an 
opt-<)Ut hon1e n1ortgage . For example, sticky defaults 
n1ay not be sticky enough to alter outcon1es, given 
market pressures. The default could be undermined 
through the firm's incentive structures for loan offi­
cers and brokers, which could provide greater rewards 
fi:)r nonstandard loans. Implementation of the measure 
may be costly, and the disclosure requirement and un­
certainty regarding enforcement of the standard might 
reduce overall access to home mortgage lending. There 
n1ay be too many cases in which alternative products 
are optin1al, so that the default product is in essence 
"'incorrect" and comes to be seen as such. The default 
\Vould then matter less over time, and the process 
of deviating from it \Vould become increasingly just 
another burden (like existing disclosure paper\vork) 
along the road to getting a home inortgage loan. Lo\\'­
income, minority, or first-time homeowners who have 
benefited fron1 more flexible under\vriting and more 
innovative mortgage developn1ents might see their ac­
cess reduced if the standard set of mortgages does not 
include products suitable to their needs. 
()ne could improve these outcomes in a variety 
of \vays. For example, the opt-out regulation could 
require that the standard set of mortgages include 
a thirty-year fixed n1ortgage, a five- or seven-year 
adjustable-rate mortgage, and straightforward mort­
gages designed to meet the particular needs of first­
time, minority, or lo\v-income homeo\\rners. ()nc 
might develop "'sn1art defaults," based on key bor­
rO\\'er characteristics, such as income and age. With a 
handful of key facts, an optimal default might be of­
fered to an individual borro\ver. The optimal default 
\\'ould consist of a mortgage or set of mortgages that 
1nost closely align with the set of mortgages that the 
typical borro\ver with that income, age, and educa­
tion \\'ould prefer. For example, a borro\ver with ris­
ing income prospects might appropriately be offered 
a five-year adjustable rate mortgage. Smart defaults 
might reduce error costs associated \Vith the pro­
posal and increase the range of mortgages that can 
be developed to meet the needs of a broad range 
of borro\vers, including lo\ver-income or first-time 
homeo\vners; ho\Vever, smart defaults may add to 
consumer confusion. Even if the consumer (with the 
particular characteristics encompassed by the smart 
default) faces a single default product, spillover from 
opticH1S across the market may make decision making 
n1ore difficult. Finally, it may be difficult to design 
smart defaults consistent \vith fair lending rules. 
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If Congress \Vere to revisit this proposal in the fu­
ture, it could authorize the CFPB to implement such 
a program. Supervisory implementation \\'Ould help 
to improve the standard mortgage choice set and to 
reduce enforcement costs over time. The CFPB could 
be required periodically to revie\v the defaults and to 
conduct consun1er experimental evaluation or survey 
research to test both the products and the disclosures, 
so that these stay current with developments in the 
home mortgage market. Indeed, lenders might be re­
quired to conduct such research and to disclose the 
results to the CFPB and the public upon developing 
a new product and its related disclosures. In addition, 
the CFPB might use the results of the research to 
provide safe harbors or no-action letters for disclo­
sures that are shown to be reasonable ex ante. The 
CFPB could conduct ongoing supervision and test­
ing of compliance with the opt-out regulations and 
disclosure requirements. Through such no-action let­
ters, safe harbors, supervision, and other regulatory 
guidance, the CFPB can develop a body of law that 
would increase compliance across the diverse financial 
sectors involved in mortgage lending, \vhile reducing 
the uncertainty facing lenders from the ne\V opt-out 
requirement and providing greater freedom for finan­
cial innovation. 
RESTRUCTURE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BROKERS 
ANO BORROWERS 
An additional approach to addressing the problem of 
market incentives to exploit behavioral biases would 
be to focus directly on restructuring brokers' duties 
to borrowers and reforming con1pensation schemes 
that provide incentives to brokers to mislead borrow­
ers. Mortgage brokers have dominated the subprime 
market. Brokers generally have been compensated 
veith yield spread premiums (YSP) for getting bor­
ro\vers to pay higher rates than those for \\'hich the 
borro\ver would qualify. Such YSPs have been used 
widely. 11 In loans with YSPs, unlike other loans, there 
is a \vide dispersion in prices paid to mortgage bro­
kers. As Jackson and Burlingame (2007) have sho\\'n, 
\Vithin the group of other\vise comparable borrow­
ers paying YSPs, African Americans paid $474 more 
tOr their loans, and Hispanics $590 more, than white 
borro\vers; thus, even if minority and white borrowers 
could qualify for the san1e rate, in practice minority 
borro\vers are likely to pay 1nuch more .12 
Brokers cannot be monitored effectively by bor­
ro\\'ers (See Jackson and Burlinga1ne, 2007), and it is 
dubious that additional disclosures \Vould help bor­
rowers be better monitors (see, e.g., Federal Trade 
(�on1mission, 2007), because, an1ong other things, 
borrowers do not always recognize potential conflicts 
of interest and because brokers' disclosures of such 
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conflicts can paradoxic.1lly increase consumer trust 
(C:ain, Loc,venstcin, and Moore, 2005 ). When a bro­
ker is seen to divulge that he \Vorks for hin1selt� not in 
the interest of the bornnvcr, the borrower's trust in 
the broker may increase: here is a broker \vho is being 
honest! Moreover, the subpri1ne mortgage crisis sug­
gests that \vhile in theory creditors and investors have 
some incentives to monitor brokers, they do not do 
so effectively. 
It is possible to undertake an array of structural 
changes regarding the broker-borrO\\'Cr relationship. 
For cxan1ple, one could alter the incentives of credi­
tors and investors to monitor mortgage brokers by 
changing liability rules so that broker misconduct 
can be attributed to lenders and creditors in suits by 
bornl\vers (sec Engel and McCoy, 2007). One could 
directly regulate mortgage brokers through licensing 
and registration requiren1cnts (as is done else\.vhere, 
e.g., in the United Kingdom); recent U.S. legislation, 
kno\vn as the SAFE Act, no\\' mandates licensing and 
reporting requirements for brokers. In addition, the 
ex post disclosure standard we suggest n1ight have a 
salutary eftCct by making it 1nore costly for lenders 
\Vhen brokers evade disclosure duties, thus generating 
better monitoring of brokers. 
We also suggest that the duties of care that mort­
gage brokers owe to borro¥.'ers should be raised. A 
higher duty of care \\'ould 1nore closely confOrm to 
borro\\1Cr expectations about the role of mortgage 
brokers in the market. In addition, we support the 
banning of YSPs that are based on the interest rate 
charged, for example. Banning YSPs could reduce 
abuses by elin1inating a strong incenti\'e tOr brokers 
to seek out higher-cost loans tOr custo1ners. ln fact, 
a nun1ber of lenders moved a\vay fro1n YSPs to fixed 
tCes \Vith son1c funds held back until the loan has per­
tOrn1ed well tOr a period of time, precisely because 
of broker conflicts of interest in seeking higher YSPs 
rather than sound loans. Banning YSPs is another \Vay 
to reintOrce high-road practices and protect against 
a renewed and profitable 10¥.r-road push to increase 
1narket share once stability is restored to mortgage 
markets. Banning YSPs affects the payoff that brokers 
receive for mortgage products and thus constitutes a 
tOrm of scoring change, corresponding to regulation 
in the bottom right of table 26.3. 
PROGRESS UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
The Dodd-frank Act fundan1entally reforms con­
sumer financial protection policy in the United States. 
In the mortgage market, the Dodd-Frank Act un­
dertakes a number of steps to regulate the relation­
ship ben.veen borrowers and 1nortgage brokers. For 
exa1nple, the act requires registration and i1nposes a 
duty of care on mortgage brokers; bans steering to 
higher-cost products; and bans YSPs. The act requires 
that mortgage brokers and lenders assess a borro\ver's 
ability to repay based on docun1cntcd inco1nc, taking 
into account the fully indexed, fully amortizing rate on 
a mortgage. The act prohibits 1nandatory predispute 
arbitration clauses (\vhich lin1it one's right to access 
the courts), and it enhances disclosure requirements. 
It requires the use of escrow of taxes and insurance for 
higher-cost loans and i1nprovcs escrow disclosure for 
all loans. It makes a number of changes to the Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (H()EPA) to 
make it more effective and provide greater consumer 
protection. 
The Dodd-Frank Act also puts in place t\vo provi­
sions that tOster standardization in the products of­
fered to consumers. The act requires risk retention 
tOr securitization of mortgage loans but exempts 
Qualified Residential Mortgages, which are designed 
to be standard, high-quality mortgage products \\'ith 
straightfor\vard tenns and solid under\\rriting. for 
loans falling outside this category that are securi­
tized, the securitizer (or the originator) would need 
to retain capital to back a portion of the securitiza­
tion risk. There \vould thus be a strong incentive to 
make Qualified Residential Mortgages. The Dodd­
frank Act also sets out provisions for qualified 1nort­
gages, ones tOr \\'hich the ability-to-pay requirc1nent 
is dee1ned to be 1net. In sum, the act defines an ap­
proach to the standardization of the tern1s and under­
writing of such mortgages. Lenders making nonquali­
fied n1ortgages face a larger potential risk of liability in 
the event that such loans fail. 
More fundamentally, the act put in place the new 
CFPB to supervise major financial institutions and to 
set rules and enfi)rce consun1cr protections across the 
market. In addition to its authorities to set rules tOr 
and enforce existing consun1er financial protection 
la\vs, the CFPB has the authority to ban unfair, de­
ceptive, or abusive acts or practices. The bureau can 
also prescribe rules tOr disclosures of any consu1ner fi­
nancial product. In doing so, it v.rill rely on consun1er 
testing, can issue model disclosures that provide a safe 
harbor tOr compliance, and n1ay pern1it financial in­
stitutions to use trial disclosure programs to test out 
the eftCctiveness of alternative disclosures to those 
pro\'ided tOr in the CFPB 1nodel tOrm. The Bureau 
is 1nandated to merge conflicting n1ortgage disclo­
sures fron1 the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(RESPA) and TILA into a simple tOrm. (�onsumers 
are provided \Vith rights to access infr>nnation about 
their O\vn product usage in standard, machine­
readable tOrmats. Over time, the CFPB 1nay generate 
research and cxperin1cntation that \\'ill i1nprove our 
understanding of consun1er financial decision mak­
ing, and in turn v.'ill support the bureau's supervision, 
rule-\\Titing, and cnforcc1ncnt. 
In addition to these changes to consumer finan­
cial protection, the act makes a nu1nber of changes 
to in\'estor protection. For exan1ple, it provides the 
Securities and Exchange Con1n1ission (SEC) \Nith 
authority to engage in investor testing to i1nprove 
disclosures or other rules. The SEC is authorized to 
clarify the duties of invest1ncnt advisors and broker­
dealers so that they have the same high standard of 
care-a fiduciary duty (\vhich, until no\v, investrncnt 
advisors had but broker-dealers providing individual­
ized investment advice did not). 'fhe con1mission is 
also authorized to require better disclosures of bro­
ker duties and conflicts of interest and to n1andate 
prcsalc disclosures for investn1ent products. Like the 
CFPB, the SEC: is authorized to restrict 111andatory 
predispute arbitration. These changes should niateri­
ally advance investor protections consistent \Vith the 
frame\vork we have laid out. 
Behaviorally Informed Credit Card Regulation 
USING FRAMING AND SALIENCE IN DISCLOSURES TO 
ENCOURAGE GOOD CRED IT CARD BEHAVIOR 
Credit card companies have fine-tuned product offer­
ings and disclosures in a 1nanner that appears to be 
systen1atically designed to prey on common psycho­
logical biases-biases that lin1it consu1ner ability to 
n1ake opti1nal choices regarding credit card borro\ving 
(Bar-(;ill, 2004). Behavioral econon1ics suggests that 
consumers underestimate ho\v much they \vill borro\v 
and o\'eresti1nate their ability to pay their bills in a 
timely manner, and credit card companies then price 
their credit cards and compete on the basis of these 
fundan1ental hurnan failing�. Nearly 60% of credit 
card holders do not pay their bills in full e\'ery month 
(Bucks et al., 2006). Moreover, excessive credit card 
debt can lead to bankruptcy (Mann, 2006). Mann 
( 2007) has argued that credit card companies seek to 
keep consumers in a "s\N·eat box" of distressed credit 
card debt, paying high fees fOr as long as possible be­
fore finally succun1bing to bankruptcy. 
The 2005 bankruptcy legislation focused on the 
need tOr in1proved borro\ver responsibility but paid 
insufficient attention to creditor responsibility frlr 
bornJv..'ing patterns. 13 Credit card con1panies pro­
vided complex disclosures regarding teaser rates, in­
troductory tern1s, variable rate cards, penalties, and a 
host of other nlatters. Both the terms themselves and 
the disclosures \\'ere confusing to consuiners.14 Credit 
card companies, it appears, \Vere not con1peting to 
otter the 1nost transparent pricing. 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
required national banks to engage in better credit 
card practices and to provide greater transparency 
on 111inin1un1 paymcnts,15 and the federal Reserve 
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proposed changes to its regulations under TILA, 
partly in the v..'ake of amendments contained in the 
bankruptcy legislation. 16 Under the proposals, tOr ex­
an1ple, creditors \vould need to disclose that paying 
only the minin1um balance \vould lengthen the payoff 
time and interest paid on the credit card; describe a 
hypothetical example of a payoff period paying only 
the niinin1um balance; and provide a toll�frce nu1nber 
fOr the cons111ner to ohtain an estimate of actual pay­
otf tiine. 1 7  Although the very length and complexity 
of the board's proposal hints at the difficulty of the 
task of disclosure to alter consun1er understanding 
and behavior, such i1nproved disclosures might nev­
ertheless help. 
In earlier \Vork (Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir, 
2008a ), we proposed that c:ongress could require 
that minimun1 payment terms be accompanied by 
clear statcn1ents regarding ho\v long it \VOtild take, 
and how n1uch interest V..'ould be paid, if the custo1n­
er's actual balance were paid off in 1nini1num pay­
ments, and card con1panics could be required to state 
the monthly payn1ent amount that y.,rould be required 
to pay the custon1er's actual balance in full over some 
reasonable period of tin1e, as detern1ined by regula­
tion. These tailored disclosures use framing and sa­
lience to help consumers, \vhose intuitions regarding 
compounding and tin1ing are \Veak, to 111ake bettcr­
infonned borro\ving and payn1ent choices based on 
their specific circumstances. Such an approach \vould 
niandatc behaviorally informed changes in informa­
tion disclosure rules in order to help debias consum­
ers (corresponding to the top right of table 26.3). 
Although credit card con1panies have opposed such 
ideas in the past, disclosures based on the customer's 
actual balances arc not overly burdcnson1e, as evi 
denccd by their implementation fOllowing the c:ARD 
Act of 2009. 
Disclosures regarding the expected tin1e to pay 
off actual credit card balances arc designed to f
.
tcili­
tate clearer thinking but may not be strong enough 
to 111atter. f,\'cn if such disclosure succeeds in shap­
ing intention, v..re kno\v that there is often a large gap 
bet\veen intention and action. JH In tact, borro\vers 
\vould need to change their behavior in the face of 
strong inertia and marketing by credit card compa­
nies, \vhich often propel then1 to make no more than 
mini1nun1 payn1cnts. More generally, once enacted, 
market players opposed to such disclosures \vould 
pron1ptly \York to undermine then1 \\'ith countervail­
ing nlarketing and other policies. And there could be 
occasional costs in other directions: tOr example, con­
sumers \Vho used to pay 1nore than the amount re­
quired to pay off their bills in the ti1ne fra111c specified 
by regulators nlay nov.' be drav..'n to pay off their bills 
more slov..,ly. Recent prelin1inary research by Tufano 
(2009) suggests that the CARD Act may have had this 
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mixed ctfect-improving the outcomes fOr borro\vers 
who paid more slowly, \vhilc \\'Orsening the outcomes 
for those '"'ho previously caught up more quickly than 
the statement's anchor on a payoff plan of three years. 
AN OPT-OUT PAYMENT PLAN FOR CREDIT CARDS 
A related approach, intended to fJ.cilitate behavior 
through intention, \Vould be to develop an opt-out 
payment plan for credit cards under which consumers 
would need to elect a default payment level meant 
to pay off their existing balance over a chosen pe­
riod of tin1e unless the custon1er affirmatively opted 
out and chose an alternative payn1ent at any point. 19 
c:onsu1ners could elect to alter their chosen payn1ent 
plan in advance or could, ¥.'ith modest friction costs, 
opt out and change the plan at the tin1e they receive 
their bill. Such an approach corresponds to changing 
the rules through opt-out policies (top right of ta­
ble 26.3). Given \vhat v.'e kno\.v al)out default rules, 
such payment plans may create expectations about 
consu1ner conduct, and in any event, inertia would 
cause many households simply to tOllo"'' the initially 
chosen plan. Increasing such behavior, as driven by 
prior intentions, could mean lo\ver rates of interest 
and fees paid, and lower incidences of financial fail­
ure. A chosen opt-out payment plan may also impose 
costs. Son1e consu1ners \vho, in the absence of the 
opt-out plan, \vould have paid off their credit cards 
sooner, might underestimate their capacity and opt 
f(>r a slov.'er payment plan, thus incurring higher costs 
from interest and fees. Alternatively, son1e consumers 
may fOllov.' their chosen opt-out payment plan \\'hen 
it is unaftOrdable for them, consequently reducing 
necessary consumption, such as medical care or suf­
ficient food, or incurring other costly forms of debt. 
Still, conffonting the need to determine a default pay­
ment plan may tOrce card holders to address the real­
ity of their borrowing and help to alter their borro\v­
ing behavior or their payoff plans. 
REGULATE LATE FEES 
One problen1 with the pricing of credit cards is that 
credit card firms can charge late and over-limit fees 
with relative impunity because consumers typically 
do not believe ex ante that they \vill pay such fees. 
Instead, consumers shop based on other f3.ctors, such 
as annual fees, interest rates, or various rev.'ard pro­
grams. I n  principle, fir1ns need to charge late and 
over-limit fees in order to incentivize customers to 
avoid late fees and going over their credit limits. Jn 
practice, given the high fees they charge, credit card 
firms are perfectly content to let consumers pay late 
and exceed their limits. 
In earlier \Vork, \Ve proposed changing the scor­
ing of the game (corresponding to a regulatory choice 
in the bottom right of table 26.3).  Under our pro­
posal, firn1s could deter consumers from paying late 
or going over their credit card limits \Vith whatever 
fees they deemed appropriate, but the bulk of such 
tees would be placed in a public trust to be used tOr 
financial education and assistance to troubled bor­
ro\vers. Firn1s \Vould retain a fixed percentage of the 
tees to pay for their actual costs incurred from late 
pay1nents or over-lin1it charges, and tOr any increased 
risks of default that such behavior presages. The ben­
efit of such an approach is that it per1nits fir1ns to 
deter "bad conduct" by consumers who pay late or 
go over credit liinits but prevents fir1ns fro1n profiting 
fro1n consun1ers' predictable n1isforecasts regarding 
their own late payment and over-the-limit behaviors. 
Firms' incentives to encourage or overcharge tOr such 
behaviors \vould be ren1ovcd, \.vhile their incentives 
to deter consumer f3.ilures appropriately and cover a 
firm's costs v.·hen they occur \vould be maintained. 
ADVANCES IN THE CARD ACT OF 2009 
The CARD Act of 2009 enacted a number of key 
changes to the credit card 1narket that take seriously 
the behavioral insights and the incentives of firms to 
exploit consun1er failings. For example, the CARD 
Act provides for improvements in plain language 
disclosures and timing on credit card agreements. It 
requires credit card companies to notif).• consumers 
tOrty-five days in advance of certain major changes 
to card tern1s, such as interest rates and fees, and it 
requires that disclosures include infOr1nation on the 
tin1e and cost of making only the minin1un1 payment, 
as \Vell as the time and cost of paying off the balance 
\Vithin three years. Moreover, consumers are provided 
with nlonthly and year-to-date figures on interest 
costs and fCcs incurred, so that they can n1orc read­
ily con1pare anticipated costs with their actual usage 
patterns. The act requires firms to obtain consumers' 
consent-an opt�in-for over-limit transactions. The 
act bans practices such as certain retroactive rate hikes 
on existing balances, late tee traps (including mid-day 
due ti1nes, due dates less than nventy-one days after 
the time of mailing staten1ents, and nloving due dates 
around each month), and double cycle billing. 'fhese 
practices have in common that consun1ers cannot 
readily shape their behavior to avoid the charges; the 
fees or changes in question arc not readily shopped 
tOr in choosing a credit card, and disclosures are of 
little help. Since consuJners generally do not under­
stand how payments are allocated across account 
balances even after improved disclosures (Federal 
Reserve 2007a,b, 2008 ), the act requires a consun1er's 
payments above the minimum required to be applied 
first toward higher-cost balances. In addition, the act 
takes up the concern \Vith late tCes but goes beyond 
our proposals. Instead, recognizing that consumers 
do not shop for penalty fees and that they often mis­
forecast their O\Vn behavior, it requires that late tCcs 
and other penalty fees be ''reasonable and propor­
tionate," as detern1ined by implementing rules; that 
in any event the fees not be larger than the amount 
charged that is over the limit or late; and that a late 
fee or other penalty tee cannot be assessed more than 
once frlr the san1e transaction or event. Furthermore, 
the act takes steps to make it easier fOr the market to 
develop mechanisms for consun1er comparison shop­
ping by requiring the public posting to the Federal 
Reserve of credit card contracts in inachine-readable 
formats. Private finns or nonprofits can then develop 
tools for experts and consumers to use to evaluate 
these various contracts. The CFPB v.rill undoubtedly 
have occasion to revie\v these and other requirements 
in the future. 
Increasing Saving among Low- and 
Moderate-Income Households 
We have focused in this chapter on i1nproving out­
comes in the credit markets using insights from be­
havioral economics and industrial organization. ()ur 
focus derives from the relative lack of attention to this 
area in the behavioral literature thus far and from the 
fact that credit markets pose a challenge to approaches 
that do not pay sufficient heed to the incentives firms 
have to exploit consumer biases. Savings is another 
area ripe fOr further exan1ination. Whereas n1uch of 
the behaviorally infonned policy \Vork on saving has 
thus far tOcused on using def3ults to improve retire­
ment saving, many lo\v- and moderate-income (LMI) 
households have a much greater need to focus on 
basic banking services and short-tern1 savings options, 
services which, fOr this population, are likely to re­
quire a different mix of governmental responses than 
those in the context of retiren1ent savings fOr middle­
and upper-inco1ne households. 
Many LMI individuals lack access to financial ser­
vices, such as checking accounts or easily utilized sav­
ings opportunities, that 1niddle-incon1e families take 
for granted. High-cost financial services, barriers to 
savings, lack of insurance, and credit constraints in­
crease the economic challenges faced by LMI fa1nilies. 
In the short run, it is often hard fOr these f31nilies to 
deal v.rith fluctuations in income that occur because 
of job changes, instability in hours \\'orked, medi­
cal emergencies, changes in f3mily composition, or a 
myriad of other tJ.ctors that cause abrupt changes in 
economic inf!o\VS and outflO\VS. At lo\V income levels, 
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small incon1e fluctuations n1ay create serious problen1s 
in paying rent, utilities, or other bills. Moreover, the 
high costs and lo\\' utility of financial services used by 
many lo\v-income households extract a daily toll on 
take-hon1e pay. Limited access to mainstrca1n financial 
services reduces ready opportunities to save and limits 
fan1ilies' ability to build assets and save tOr the fu ture. 
In theory, opt-out policies ought to \vork \Veil 
among LMI households, as in the retirement \\'Orid, 
in encouraging saving. However, while in general the 
1narket pulls in the same direction as policy in encour­
aging saving, market fOrces v.1eaken or break do\\'n en­
tirely \\.ith respect to encouraging LMI households' 
saving. This is si1nply because the administrati\'e costs 
of collecting sn1all-value deposits are high in rela­
tion to the banks' potential earnings on the relatively 
small a1nounts saved, unless the bank can charge high 
fees; and \Vith sufficiently high tees, it is not clear 
that utilizing a bank account n1akcs economic sense 
for LMI households. Indeed, the current structure 
of bank accounts is one of the primary reasons \vhy 
LMI households do not have then1. High minin1um 
balance requirements, high tees for overdraft protec­
tion or bounced checks, and delays in check clear­
ance, dissuade LMI households from opening or re­
taining bank transaction accounts. Moreover, banks 
use the private ChexSystem to screen out households 
\Vho have had difficulty \\'ith accounts in the past. 
Behaviorally insightful t\veaks, \Vhile helpful, are un­
likely to suffice in this context; rather, along \Vith the 
behavior of consu1ners \vho open and inaintain them, 
\Ve need to change the nature of the accounts being 
offered. 
Proposals in this area pertain to changing the rules 
and the scoring on the left-hand side of table 26.3, 
\vhere markets may prove neutral to, or even positively 
inclined tOv.'ard, the potential reduction of consun1er 
tJ.llibility. We need to figure out ho\v to increase scale 
and to offset costs fi>r the private sector to increase 
saving by LMI families. We propose three options: a 
new "gold seal" tOr financial institutions in return tOr 
oftCring sate and affordable bank accounts; various 
tOrms of tax credits, subsidies, or in novation prizes; 
and a proposal under \\'hich the Treasury \\'Ould di­
rect deposit tax refunds into opt-out bank accounts 
auton1atically set up at tax tin1e. 'I"he proposals arc de­
signed to induce the private sector to change their ac­
count offerings by offering government inducen1ent 
to reach scale, as v.rcll as to alter consun1cr behavior 
through the structure of the accounts offered. In par­
ticular, the govern1nent seal of approval, tax credit or 
subsidy, or bundling through the direct deposit of tax 
refunds changes the scoring to firms for oftering such 
products, \Vhile the opt-out nature of the proposal 
and other behavioral t\veaks change the starting rules. 
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()nc re)·Jtivdy "light touch" approach to in1prov­
ing outcon1cs in this area \Vould be to ofter a gov� 
crnn1cnt "gold sc.11" for financial institutions offering 
sate and affr)rdablc bank accounts. While the gold seal 
\vould not change the costs of the accounts the1n­
selves, it might increase the potency of the bank's 
n1arkcting and thus reduce acquisition costs; also, the 
good\vill gcncr,1ted n1ight i1nprovc the bank's in1age 
overall and thus contribute to profitability. Sin1ilarly, 
s111,1ll prizes fi:lr innovation in serving LMI customtrs 
1night heighten attention to the issue and increase in­
vcstn1cnt in research and develop1nent of technology 
to serve the poor. Grants to local con11nunities and 
nonprofits n1ay increase their outreach and in1prove 
the provision of financial cJucation and infOrrnation 
and help b<u1ks and credit unions reach out to LMI 
custon1crs. 
l'o overcon1e the problc1n of the high fixed costs of 
offering sensible transaction accounts to lo\v-inco1ne 
individuals \Vith lo\v savings levels, Congress could 
en;.1ct a ta>. credit fr)r financial institlltions that of}Cr 
safe and affordable bank accounts to LMI households 
( B,1rr 2004, 2007). The tax credit \\'Otild be pay-for­
perfonnancc, \Vith financial institutions able to clain1 
tax credits tOr a fixed an1ount per account opened by 
LMI households. The accounts eligible for tax credit 
could be structured and priced by the private sector 
according to essential terms required by regulation. 
i-::or exa1nple, costly and inefficient checking accounts 
\Vith a high risk of overdraft \VOtild be eschev.'Cd in 
tavor of kl\v-cost, k)\v-risk accounts \Vith only debit­
card ,1ccess. The accounts \\'Otild be debit-card based, 
\Vith no check-\\'riting capability\ no overdrafts per-
1nitted, and no C:hexSyste1ns rejections for past ac­
count tJilures in the absence of fraud or other mean­
ingfi.11 abuse. 
Direct-deposit tax refund accounts could be used 
to encourage saYings and expanded access to bank­
ing services, \vhile reducing reliance on costly refund­
anticipation loans and check-cashing services (Barr 
2004, 2007). Under the plan, unbanked lo\\'-inco111e 
households \Vho file their tax returns \Vould haYc their 
tax refunds directly deposited into a ne\v account. 
l)ircct deposit is significantly cheaper and taster than 
paper checks, both fi>r the government and for taxpay­
er.�. Taxpayers could choose to opt out of the systein 
if they did not \Vant to directly deposit their refund, 
but the expectation is that the accounts \Votild be 
\vidcly accepted since they \Vould significantly reduce 
the costs and expedite the tin1ing of receiving one's 
tax refund. By using an opt-out strategy and reach­
ing households at tax tin1e, this approach couJd help 
to 0Yercon1c the tendency to procrastinate in setting 
up accounts. By reducing the tin1e it takes to receive 
a refund and pern1itting a portion of the funds to be 
used to pay for tax preparation, setting up such ac­
counts could help to reduce the incentives to take out 
costly refund loans, incentives that are magnified by 
ten1poral 1nyopia and misunderstanding regarding the 
costs of credit. Such accounts would also eliminate 
the need to use costly check-cashing services fr>r one's 
tax refund check. Moreover, the account could con­
tinue to be used past tax tin1e. Households could use 
the account like any other bank account-to receive 
their income, save, pay bills, and, of course, to receive 
their refund in follc)\ving years. There are a variety of 
\\'ays to structure these accounts, all of \Vhich \Vould 
deploy opt-out strategies and government bundling 
to reach scale and better align the costs of overcom­
ing consun1er bias \Vith the shared benefit of 111ov­
ing households into the banking system .  Such an ap­
proach could efficiently bring n1illions of households 
into the banking systen1. 
The po\ver of these initiatives could be significantly 
increased if it \Vere coupled \Vith a series of behavior­
ally infOrn1cd efforts to i111prove the take-up of the 
accounts and the savings outcon1es for account hold­
ers. For exa1nple, banks could encourage en1ployers 
to endorse direct deposit and auton1atic sayings plans 
to set up default rules that \Vould increase savings 
outcon1es. With an auto1natic savings plan, accounts 
could be structured so that holders could designate a 
portion of their paycheck to be deposited into a sav­
ings «pocket"; the savings feature \\'Ould rely on the 
prccon11nitn1ent device of auton1atic savings, and the 
funds \vould be some\vhat 1nore difficult to access than 
those in the regular bank account to make the com-
1nitment n1ore likely to stick. To provide the necessary 
access to e1nergency funds in a more cost-effective 
manner than is usually available to LMI households, 
the bank account could also include a six-1nonth con­
su1ner loan \Vith direct deposit and direct debit, using 
relationship banking and auton1ated pay111ent systems 
to provide an alternative to costly payday loans. With 
direct deposit of income and direct debit of interest 
and principal due, the loan should be relatiYely lo\v­
risk and costless fOr the bank to service. With a lon­
ger pay1nent period than in typical payday lending, 
the loan should be 1nore manageable fOr consumers 
living paycheck to paycheck and \vould likely lead to 
less repeated borro\ving undertaken to stay current 
on past loans. Moreover, the loan repayn1ent features 
could also include a provision that consumers "pay 
the1nselvcs first," by including a savings deposit to 
their account \Vi th every payment. Such a prcco1nmit­
ment device could overcome the bias to procrastinate 
in savings and reduce the Jikchhood of needing future 
emergency borrowing. All these efforts could increase 
take up of the banking product and lead to improved 
savings outcomes. 
The federal government under President Obarna 
has made some progress to\vard these objectives over 
the last couple of years. The Treasury Department has 
launched pilot programs to test different product at­
tributes, including debit cards and payroll cards, and 
the FDIC: has launched a pilot \Vith a group of banks 
to test consumer demand and sustainability of a sate 
and affordable account, using an FDIC template, or 
gofd seal. Finally, the Treasury obtained authorization 
in the Dodd-Frank Act to experin1ent with a variety of 
methods to increase access to bank accounts for lo\v­
incorne households, including the provision of seed 
money for research and development into innovative 
technology and services. 
Conclusion 
We have proposed a conceptual framework for behav­
iorally infor1ned regulation. The frame\\'ork relies on a 
n1ore nuanced understanding of human behavior than 
is fOund in the classical rational actor model, which 
underlies inuch policy thinking. Whereas the classi­
cal perspective generally assumes people kno\\.' what is 
important and knowable, that they plan \vith insight 
and patience, and that they carry out their plans \\1ith 
\Visdom and self-control, the central gist of the behav­
ioral perspective is that people often fail to know and 
understand things that matter; that they misperceive, 
rnisallocate, inispredict, and fail to carry out their in­
tended plans; that the context in \vhich they function 
has great impact; and that institutions shape defaults, 
planning, and behavior itself Behaviorally informed 
regulation is cognizant of the importance of framing 
and defaults, of the gap bet\veen information and un­
derstanding and benveen intention and action, and 
of the role of decisional conflict and other psycho­
logical factors that affect ho\v people behave. At the 
same time, \Ve argue, behaviorally informed regula­
tion needs to take into account not only behavioral 
insights about individuals but also economic insights 
about 1narkets. 
In this frame\\'ork, successful regulation requires 
integrating a more nuanced vie\\-' of hun1an behavior 
\Vi th an understanding of markets. Markets have been 
shoivn to systematicaJly favor overcoming behavloral 
biases in some contexts and to systematically fiivor ex­
ploiting those biases in other contexts. A central illus­
tration of this distinction is the contrast between the 
market for saving and that fOr borro\ving-in \\-'hich 
the same fundamental hu1nan tendency to underap­
preciate the impact of compounding interest leads 
to opposite market reactions. In the savings context, 
firms seek to overcome the bias; in the credit con­
text, they seek to exploit it. Our fra1nC\\'Ork largely 
BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED REGULATION • 457 
retains the classical perspective of consumers interact­
ing \\'ith firms in competiti\'e nlarkets. The difference 
is that consumers are no\v understood to be fallible 
in systematic and important \vays, and firms are seen 
to have incentives to overcome or to exploit these 
shortcomings. 
More generally, fir1ns not only \\'ill operate on the 
contour defined by human psychology but also \viii 
respond strategically to regulations. And finns get to 
act last. Because the firm has a great deal of latitude 
in issue fiaming, product design, and so on, they have 
the capacity to affect consumer behavior and in so 
doing to circumvent or pervert regulatory constraints. 
Ironically, firms' capacity to do so is enhanced by their 
interaction ivith "behavioral" consumers (as opposed 
to the hypothetically rational consumers of neoclassi­
cal cconon1ic theory), since so many of the things a 
regulator would find hard or undesirable to control 
(e.g. tiames, design nuance, complexity) can be used 
to influence consumers' behavior greatly. The chal­
lenge of behaviorally intOrmed regulation, therefore, 
is to envision not only the role of human behavior, but 
also the \\'ays in \vhich firn1s are likely to respond to 
consumer behavior and to the structure of regulation. 
We have developed a model in which outcon1es are 
an equilibrium interaction between individuals \Vith 
specific psychologies and firms that respond to those 
psychologies within specific markets. l"hese outcomes 
may not be socially optimal. To the extent that the 
interaction produces real harm, regulation could ad­
dress the potential social \Velfare implications of this 
equilibriun1. Taking both individual psychology and 
industrial organization seriously suggests the need tOr 
policy makers to consider a range of market-context­
specific policy options, including both changing the 
"rules" of the game, as well as changing its "scoring." 
We have explored some specific applications of this 
conceptual frame\vork for financial services. 
Notes 
1 .  In addition to incentives to increase savings, employers 
also seek to boost en1ployee retention, and they must com­
ply \Vith federal pension rules designed to ensure that the 
plan5 an: not "top heavy. " Moreover, there are significant 
con1pliance issues regarding pensions and retiren1ent plans, 
disclosure failures, fee churning and complicated and costly 
fee structures, and conflicts of interest in plan managen1ent, 
as \veil as problems with encouraging employers to sign up 
luv ...·"'':age workers fOr retirement plans. Yet, as a comparative 
matter, 1narket incentiYes to overco1ne psychological biases 
in order to encourage saving arc more aligned with optimal 
social policy than arc nlarket incentives to exacerbate psy­
chological biases to encourage borro\ving. 
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2. \Ve use this bin1odal franlC\vork of regulatory choice 
to sin1p!ify the exploration of ho\\' our n1odel of individual 
psychology and firm incentives affects regulation. We ac­
kno\vkdgc that the regulatory choice matrix is n1ore com­
plex (see Barr, 2005). 
3. This is largely because of the existing regulatory 
fran1e\vork: pension regulation gives en1ploycrs incentives to 
enroll lowcr-incon1c individnals in 40l(k) progran1s. Absent 
these, it is likely that firn1s \vould he happy to discourage 
enrollment since they often n1ust pay the n1atch fi)r these 
individuals. This point is interesting because it suggests that 
even defaults in savings only \Vork because some other regu­
lation "changed the scoring" of the gan1e. 
4. This example abstracts fron1 collection coses (\�:hich 
\vould reduce finns' incentives to hide borro\ving costs) and 
instead frKuses on the short-term behavior generally exhib­
ited by firms, as in the recent home 1nortgage crisis. 
5. In the interests of fi.ill disclosure, one of us (Barr), \Vas 
the assistant secretary of the treasury tOr financial institu ­
tions from 2009 to 2 0 1 0  and led the effort to put in place a 
number of these retOrn1s in the CARD Act, the Dodd-.frank 
Act, and other Treasury initiatives. 
6. See Federal Reserve Board, Final Rule Amending 
Regulation Z, 1 2  CFR Part 226 (July 14, 2008); Summary 
of" findings: (;onsumer testing of' mortgage broker disclo­
sures. Sub1nitted to the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, July IO, 2008 (Retrieved from http:// 
\\'WV.'. tCd c ral rese rvc. gov/ n e\vsev en ts/press /bcre g/2 0 0 8 
0714regzconstest.pdf); Federal Reserve Board, Proposed 
Rule Amending Regulation Z, 72 Fed. Reg. l 14:  32948 
(codified at 12 CFR Part 226 [June 14, 2007]); Federal 
Reserve Board (2007a). 
7. Although the financial industry often calls tor "prin­
ciples based" approaches to regulation, in the course of the 
})odd-Frank Act legislative debate, the industry strongly re­
sisted this approach, perhaps for these reasons. 
8 .  Ian Ayres recently suggested to us that the burden 
might be placed on the plaintitTto use consumer survey data 
to sho\\-' thac the disclosure was unreasonable, si1nilar to the 
process used under the Lanhan1 Act for false advertising 
claims. In individual cases, this might be infeasible, but such 
an approach might work either for class actions or for clain1s 
brought by the Cf PB. 
9. Again, in the interest of full disclosure, this proposal 
was included in the Treasury Department's legislation tor 
the new <:FPB but \Vas not included in the final legislation 
as enacted. 
1 0. See the discussion above relating to the reasonable­
ness standard for disclosure. As noted above, consumer 
survey evidence could be introduced, either by the <:FPB, 
plaintiftS, or defendants, as to the reasonableness standard. 
1 1 .  Sec Jackson and Burlingame (2007). While in prin­
ciple YSPs could permit lenders lcgiti1natcly to pass on the 
cost of a mortgage broker tee to a cash-strapped borrower 
in the fOrm of a higher interest rate rather than in the fOnn 
of a cash payment, the evidence suggests that YSPs are in 
fact used to compensate brokers for getting bornnvcrs to 
accept higher interest rates, prepayment penalties, and other 
loan tcrn1s. 
12.  See also Guttentag (2000). 
1 3 .  See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-8, 1 1 9  Stat. 23 
(codified at 1 1 U.S.<:. § 1 0 1  ct seq (2005)). 
14. See, e.g., U. S. General Accounting Office (2006). 
1 5 .  Sec, e.g., ()fficc of the Comptroller of the c:urrcney 
(2003, 2004a, 2004b ). 
16. Sec Federal Reserve Board (2007b). 
1 7 .  federal Reserve Board, Proposed Ruic, 12 C.FR. 226, 
prnpo"<l §.7(b)( l2), implementing 15 U.S.C. §1 637(b)( l l ). 
1 8 .  Buehler, Ciriffin, and Ross (2002 ); Kochler and Poon, 
(2005). 
19. Barr (2007). For a related proposal, see Gordon and 
Douglas (2005), in \vhich they argue tOr an opt-out direct­
dcbit arrangctncnt fr)r credit cards. 
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